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A substantial literature has grown up around the issue of how inward direct investment affects 
host countries. On almost every aspect of this question, there seems to be a wide range of 
empirical results in academic literature, and little sign of convergence. It is our purpose here to 
try to understand why contradictory results seem to be found by different investigators. Is it that 
the statistical techniques are different?  Or are the countries they examine different?  Or are they 
asking different questions under the same labels of wages, productivity, or spillovers?  We try to 
answer these questions in two ways. One is to review the individual studies themselves to clarify 
the questions asked and the data used. The other is to survey studies on data for Indonesia, which 
cover a long period and are detailed and accessible, to test the implications of different 
definitions and methods.  
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Host Country Impacts of Inward FDI: Why such Different Answers? 
 






  A substantial literature has grown up around the issue of how inward direct investment 
(FDI) affects host countries.  On almost every aspect of this question, there seems to be a wide 
range of empirical results in academic literature, and little sign of convergence.  At the same 
time, policy makers seem to have made their own judgments that inward FDI is valuable to their 
countries.  UNCTAD publishes annual data on “changes in national regulations of FDI” and 
reports that from 1991 through 2002, there were over 1500 changes making regulations more 
favorable to FDI and fewer than 100 making regulations less favorable (UNCTAD, 2003, Table 
1.8, p. 21).  The same document reports that “The use of locational incentives to attract FDI has 
considerably expanded in frequency and value.” (ibid, p. 124).  
 Why has the academic literature made so little impression on policy making?  Are all 
these countries foolishly pursuing an ephemeral fad?  Is it that the questions asked in the 
academic literature have not been relevant to policy?  Are the relevant questions answerable?  
What are the relevant questions? 
There are many possible effects of an inflow of FDI on a host country.  It is generally 
taken for granted that the investing firms possess some technology superior to that of local, host 
country firms.  One possible impact would be the production of goods and services of higher 
quality than previously available or at lower prices, resulting in higher consumer welfare.  That 
topic seems to be almost completely absent from the literature and may be of little interest to 
policy makers, although it should be of interest to economists.  Another possibility, not   3
dependent on the technological superiority of investing firms, would be that the inward 
investment adds to the host country capital stock and in doing so raises the level of output. That 
issue has been explored, especially in earlier literature on whether inward investment or aid 
supplements or displaces local investment, but is not specific to direct investment.  Most 
attention specific to direct investment has been devoted to the question of whether inward 
investments do involve higher levels of technology and, if they do, whether that superior 
technology is not retained entirely by the foreign- owned firms but “spills over” to domestically- 
owned firms.  A related set of questions is whether the foreign- owned firms pay higher wages 
for domestic labor, whether those higher wages raise the average wage level, and whether these 
higher wages spill over to domestically- owned firms.  For both wages and productivity, the 
spillovers to domestically- owned firms or establishments could be either positive or negative.  
Wage spillovers could be negative, for example, if the foreign- owned firms hired the best 
workers, at their going wages or higher ones, leaving only lower- quality workers for the 
domestically- owned firms.  Productivity spillovers could be negative if foreign- owned firms 
took market shares from domestically- owned firms, leaving the latter to produce at lower, less 
economical, production levels. 
Survey articles have found the literature to be inconclusive on most important impacts of 
inward FDI, especially with respect to spillovers.  On wage spillovers, Görg and Greenaway 
(2001) reported that panel data showed negative spillovers, but cross- sectional data, positive 
ones.  The same paper found, with respect to productivity spillovers from foreign- owned to 
domestically- owned firms “…only limited evidence in support of positive spillovers…Most 
work fails to find positive spillovers, with some even reporting negative spillovers…” (p. 23).  
Görg and Strobl (2001) concluded that the crucial determinant of the findings in twenty- one   4
studies was whether cross- section or time series data had been used, with the former typically 
finding positive spillovers and the latter often negative ones.  Lipsey (2003) stated that “…the 
evidence for positive spillovers is not strong.” (p. 304) and Lipsey (2004) concluded a review of 
the literature by saying that “…the evidence on spillovers is mixed.  No universal relationships 
are evident.” (p. 365).  With respect to effects on host- country economic growth, Carkovic and 
Levine (2000) found no significant effect of FDI inflows over the whole period, 1960 to 1995, 
and only irregularly significant effects in five- year periods.  None of the variables found in other 
studies consistently determine the effect of FDI on growth, although some are significant in some 
combination of conditioning variables.  Lipsey (2003) found it “…safe to conclude that there is 
no universal relationship between the ratio of inward FDI flows to GDP and the rate of growth of 
a country.” (p. 297). 
A crucial feature of these surveys is that the studies summarized do not individually find 
that spillovers of wages or productivity do not exist.  Mostly, they find evidence for either 
positive or negative spillovers.  It is our purpose here to try to understand why contradictory 
results seem to be found by different investigators.  Is it that the statistical techniques are 
different?  Or are the countries they examine different?  Or are they asking different questions 
under the same labels of wages, productivity, or spillovers?  We try to answer these questions in 
two ways.  One is to review the individual studies themselves to clarify the questions asked and 
the data used.  The other is to survey studies on data for Indonesia, which cover a long period 
and are detailed and accessible, to test the implications of different definitions and methods. 
The studies we are reviewing in the paper examine the effects of FDI on firms and their 
workers.  They are all producer-oriented.  Another type of statistical study might be to look at 
consumption effects.  For example, has the growth of FDI in retailing reduced the prices paid by   5
consumers for food and other consumer goods?  Has the growth of FDI in utilities reduced the 
price consumers pay for telephone service or home heating and lighting?  These possible effects 
are almost totally absent from the literature. 
 
Wage spillovers 
We begin with the studies of wages, which are not as numerous as those on productivity.  
There are several general issues that run through almost all the wage studies.  One of these is that 
the wage levels are calculated as total wages or total compensation per worker.  The only 
measure of skill is a division between production and non- production or blue- collar and white 
collar workers.  Within those categories, almost no studies can separate differences in skill or 
education or differential changes in them from differences in wages for identical workers or 
changes in them.  A second issue is whether wage comparisons should take account of firm or 
establishment characteristics that are correlated with foreign ownership but not intrinsically 
related to it.  For example, foreign- owned firms or establishments are typically much larger on 
average than domestically-owned ones, even in developed countries.  They are in many 
countries, especially developing countries, more capital-intensive and also more intensive in the 
use of purchased materials or components.  Should these characteristics be treated as controls, 
and their influence eliminated, or are they so bound up with foreign ownership that they should 
not be controlled for.  As is pointed out in Aitken et al. (1996), p. 368), a host country may not 
care whether higher wages in foreign-owned plants result from the fact that they are foreign-
owned or from the fact that they are large or use capital-intensive technology or import-intensive 
technology.  Size, capital intensity, and import intensity may all be elements of the foreign firm’s 
technology.   6
Emprical studies provide strong evidence of a wage premium in foreign-owned firms 
(Lipsey, 2004). Foreign firms pay higher wages in both developed and developing countries, and 
after controlling for firm specific characteristics. It is of course possible that high wages in 
foreign-owned firms are caused, or at least biased, by foreign takeovers of high-wage domestic 
firms. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002), using a 25-year panel of Indonesian manufacturing 
establishment data, lacking labor force education data but including most of the typical 
independent variables, were able to lay this issue to rest, at least for this one country.  Foreign 
firms did tend to acquire domestic plants with higher than average blue-collar wages for their 
industries, but the margins over the averages were far too small to account for the wage 
differential between domestically- owned and foreign-owned plants.  Thus, selectivity in 
takeovers could not account for the wage gap.  Further evidence for that fact was the finding that 
after a foreign takeover of a domestically-owned plant, both blue-collar and white-collar wages 
rose strongly, in absolute terms and relative to their industries.  Takeovers of foreign-owned 
plants by domestic firms had the opposite effect on wages, showing that it was takeovers by 
foreigners, rather than takeovers in general, that produced wage increases.  Econometric analyses 
using the whole panel of establishments found large wage differences in favor of foreign firms at 
every level of industry and geographical detail, and the differentials remained large even when 
plant characteristics, such as size and the use of purchased inputs, were introduced into the wage 
equations.  The finding that wages were higher in foreign-owned plants and became higher when 
domestically-owned plants became foreign-owned was not dependent on the use of cross-section 
rather than panel data. 
Whereas the literature on wage comparisons between foreign- and domestically-owned  
firms is large, there are relatively few studies that examine the effect of FDI on wages in   7
domestically-owned firms. Görg and Greenway (2001) list six studies on wage spillovers, and 
report that of those with conclusions, three panel studies found negative spillovers and two cross-
section studies found positive ones. They do not include the information that some of the cross-
section estimates for Mexico and Venezuela also give negative coefficients for spillovers, 
suggesting that the choice of cross-section or panel estimation may not be so crucial.   
Other studies, some published after the summary above, have reported more indication of 
wage spillovers.  Figlio and Blonigen (2000) concluded that the effect of a large new foreign 
investment in South Carolina on aggregate wage levels was so large that it could not have been  
the result only of the high wages in the foreign-owned plants but must involved spillovers to 
domestically-owned plants.  Their study differed from most others in that it concentrated on 
geographical effects, not on effects within the industry of the investment. 
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004b) made a variety of calculations of spillovers in Indonesian 
manufacturing in a cross-section of manufacturing establishments in which the quality of the 
labor force, as measured by education, could be accounted for, the only wage study we know of 
where that was done.  Assuming national labor markets within broad industry groups, they found 
significant spillovers to wages in domestically- owned plants.  Narrower industry groups still 
revealed significant spillovers, but smaller ones, and assuming that an industry within an 
individual province represented a labor market still revealed spillovers to domestically-owned 
establishments.  The combination of higher wages in foreign-owned plants and spillovers to 
domestically-owned plants of course meant higher overall wages associated with foreign 
ownership. 
Further evidence that the distinction between cross-section and panel data studies is not 
the crucial determinant of results on wage spillovers can be found in Driffield and Girma (2002),   8
which uses a panel of establishments in the U.K. electronics industry from the Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD) for 1980 to 1992.  They found intra-industry and intra-region 
wage spillovers from FDI on wages in general, larger for skilled than for unskilled workers. A 
study by Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001), using firm, rather than establishment, panel 
data for almost 4,000 firms in the UK for 1991 to 1996, also found some evidence for wage 
spillovers.  On average, when spillovers were assumed to be identical across industries and 
firms, they found no significant evidence for them.  However, when the effects were permitted to 
vary across industries, wage spillovers were found and were higher in industries where the 
productivity gap between foreign and domestic firms was lower.   One difference between this 
study and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) is that it excludes firms that changed ownership, 
eliminating one part of the effect of foreign ownership on wages.  These had been found in an 
earlier study to be positive in the UK, as they were in Indonesia. 
The accumulation of studies since the earlier surveys seems to have put to rest the 
suspicion that the findings of wage spillovers were solely the result of ignoring firm differences 
in cross-section studies, since the spillovers did appear in panel studies.  Something else must 
account for the lack of spillovers or negative ones found in some developing countries.  The 
positive spillovers have been found most frequently in developed countries, aside from 
Indonesia, but even in the UK, large differences in productivity between foreign-owned and 
domestically- owned firms reduced or eliminated spillovers.  One candidate for explaining 
negative results is that in some countries the gap between the foreign-owned and domestically-
owned firms is too large for one group to influence the other.  
 Another possibility is that the labor markets in some developing countries are too 
segmented for wages in one group to influence the other.  If we compare Mexico and Venezuela,   9
two countries reported to show negative wage spillovers from foreign firms, with Indonesia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, for which positive spillovers were found, labor market 
conditions do seem to have been different.  An “employment laws index” produced by the World 
Bank (2003), following Botero et al (2003), where a high number indicated very restrictive labor 
laws on hiring, firing, and conditions of employment, put Mexico and Venezuela among the 
most restrictive countries, with index numbers of 77 and 75, compared with the United Kingdom 
at 28 and the United States at 22.  Indonesia was in between at 57, not flexible by developed 
country standards, but relatively flexible for a developing country.  
Another topic not always taken into consideration is the definition of the relevant labor 
market.  Most of the studies in effect defined a labor market as an industry, at whatever level of 
detail industry is reported.  Some define the market as an industry within the narrowest 
geographical area at which industry data are available.  That may be appropriate for some 
countries or industries, but there may also be national labor markets within an industry, or local 
labor markets that straddle many industries, or national labor markets that do so.  Differences in 
the definition of the labor market are another possible source of differences in results. Some 
thinking about the industry- and geographic construction of the FDI measures is needed, and the 
conclusion might be different for wages from what it is for productivity.  In the case of wage 
determination, the question is of the range of a labor market within which wages tend to be 
equalized, or at least within which one firm’s wages influence those in other firms.  The answers 
might be different in different countries, or industries, or at different times.  A test of the effect 
of different definitions of a labor market is to use different industry and geographic 
classifications to examine the sensitivity of the results. This was done in Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004), where FDI measures at 2-, 3- and 5-digit industry levels, and at both national and   10
province level, were constructed to examine the effect of foreign presence on the wages in 
locally-owned plants. The results for these various definitions of a labor market are shown in 
table 1. The coefficients vary substantially, but they remain statistically significant in all 
specifications.
1 The largest coefficients are for definitions of the relevant market as either 
national, at the 2-digit industry level, or at the province level, for all manufacturing industries 
combined. The worry about these coefficients is that they may represent the tendency of foreign 
firms to move into high-wage geographical locations or to move into high-wage industries.  
Those possible biases are reduced by moving to a finer geographical breakdown, by province, 
and to successively greater industry detail, culminating in breakdowns by 5-digit industry and 
province.  The coefficients are greatly reduced in size, but remain strongly significant, showing 
margins of a quarter for blue-collar and over a third for white-collar workers.  The most detailed 
breakdown is not necessarily the truth, however.  It may miss the effect of higher wages and 
increased employment in foreign-owned establishments in one industry or province on wages in 
other industries and provinces, possibly a more important effect than any within the same 
industry and province.  Even the more aggregate measures may understate the wage effect 
because they are confined to manufacturing, ignoring any impacts on agriculture, services, and 
trade. 
 
Table 1 here. 
 
Productivity spillovers 
Many of the same issues that affect studies of wage spillovers come up in the much larger 
literature on productivity spillovers.  In addition, there are broader problems with the 
                                                 
1 See Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004b) for the complete empirical specifications and results.    11
productivity measurements.  The objective is often described as measuring the spillovers of 
technology, or knowledge, from foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms.  In order to make 
measurement simpler, the definition of technology is narrowed to measures of labor productivity, 
total factor productivity, or differences in production functions.  All of these are reflections of 
technology, but they may be both too broad and too narrow.  The comparison of production 
functions, often cited as an ideal, assumes that there are no differences in technological 
knowledge involved in choices about factor combinations or plant size.  The operation of a large 
plant, as opposed to operation of a small plant, requires no different technological mastery.  The 
operation of a capital-intensive plant requires no technological skill beyond that required for a 
small plant.  The use of intermediate inputs from abroad or from a parent company involves no 
technology beyond that of using locally available inputs.  These are assumptions implicit in 
production function comparisons, but if they are invalid, and locally-owned plants do not have 
the technological skill to operate at the scale and factor combinations of foreign-owned plants, 
true technological differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants are hidden, 
disguised as differences in scale of production or factor combination choices. 
There is another respect in which the definitions of technology are too narrow.  If the 
foreign investors’ technological superiority consists of knowledge about the tastes of consumers 
in foreign markets, or in how to market a product in local or foreign markets, it will not be 
visible in productivity or production function comparisons.  It might be seen in comparisons of 
export performance, but those are a different literature, not usually characterized as technology.  
A very different type of study that takes a broad view of technology is exemplified by the 
country studies for Asia in Dobson and Chia (1997), country- and industry- specific case studies 
in Rhee and Belot (1990) of “…the critical role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the    12
transfer of technical, marketing, managerial know-how to developing countries,” and many 
examples of technology transfer cited by Moran (2001) and (2002).  All of these are basically 
case studies of particular transfers of technology, but not confined to either intra -industry or 
inter-industry transfers, and not confined to specific measures of technology.  All of them find 
evidence for transfers of technology, but it is difficult to confront their evidence with that from 
the statistical studies described below because the questions asked are so different.  The case 
studies ask whether there are examples where technology can be seen to have been transferred 
from foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms, and the answer is “Yes.”  The statistical 
studies ask whether on average domestically-owned firms gain in a particular measure of 
technology from the presence of foreign-owned firms, usually in the same industry, and the same 
country, or the same region, and the answer is “Not universally.”   Both of these answers could 
be true; neither one contradicts the other because they are answers to different questions.   
One feature of case studies is their great flexibility.  The exact nature of the technology 
transfer can differ from example to example, from industry to industry, and from country to 
country.  The length of time for the transfer to take place and be measured need not be specified 
in advance, and can vary widely.  The transfer can be within an industry, to supplying industries, 
or to consuming industries.  This flexibility is an advantage of the case study method, but it 
comes with costs.  Impacts on firms that do not receive the foreign technology are often left out 
of the accounting for the effects.  The universe over which impacts are to be measured is not 
always delineated, and the universe from which the case studies are drawn is not always defined. 
In contrast, statistical studies tend to be rigid in specifying the length of time over which 
effects are to be looked for, whether it is a year or a specified number of years.  They specify 
some particular definition of a technology transfer, perhaps ignoring other important dimensions.    13
And they specify whether differences among countries or industries are to be studied.  They 
assume the relevance of some particular measure of FDI and some functional form for its effects.  
The great advantage is that these studies tend to examine effects on whole industries, including 
the unlucky or less competent losers, as well as the winners.  With microdata, they can look at 
the characteristics of firms forced out of an industry as well as those entering and those 
remaining, and at firms changing ownership. 
A goal for case studies might be to assemble a collection of unsuccessful ventures and to 
compare them with the successful ones, with respect to their own characteristics but also, even 
more, with respect to country and industry environments.  Baranson’s (1967) book on Cummins’ 
experience in India, for example, contains an analysis of the effects of import substitution 
policies that can be compared with experiences under more liberal regimes. 
A general problem with productivity comparisons and spillover studies, as compared with 
wage studies, is the much greater data needs.  Productivity studies require output measures, 
usually sales or value added.  Sales by foreign-owned firms, particularly if they are exports, are 
frequently intra-company transactions.  The values may not be the same as market values 
because there are many incentives to alter them to minimize tax liabilities, and the incentives 
may be very different for foreign-owned firms from any that domestically-owned firms face.  
Any manipulation of sales values would affect value added even more, and there are incentives 
to manipulate the profit portion of value added in addition to those affecting sales values.  
Furthermore, since value added includes profits, it may fluctuate far more over time than any 
physical measure of production.  The use of production functions requires measures of capital 
input, often missing from Census data.  If they are present, they are often of doubtful meaning,   14
especially in countries that have suffered major inflations, because it is uncertain if and how 
historical values have been adjusted to current price levels.  
As with wage spillovers, the Görg and Strobl (2001) and Görg and Greenaway (2001) 
surveys conclude that the negative results from panel data studies are more reliable than those for 
cross-sections, and that there is, therefore, little evidence of positive spillovers from FDI.  Since 
those surveys, a number of new studies of productivity spillovers based on panel data have 
appeared.  As is true for wage spillovers, these find more evidence for positive spillovers than 
the earlier ones.  Haskel et al. (2002) use a panel of UK manufacturing plants between 1973 and 
1992 and find a positive and robust spillover effect of inward FDI on productivity in local plants.  
Keller and Yeaple (2003) find positive and robust effects of inward FDI in the United States on 
productivity in U.S. manufacturing plants between 1987 and 1996.  Girma, Greenaway, and 
Wakelin (2001), using the firm data described above, find that there are spillovers, and that they 
are greater for firms in sectors in which local firms are closer in technology to the foreign firms.  
Spillovers of labor productivity and total factor productivity are similar in size.  As with wage 
spillovers, the accumulation of studies has eroded the basis for the hypothesis that the distinction 
between cross-section and panel data studies explains the wide range of findings. 
Probably the strongest evidence for negative productivity spillovers is in Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), a panel data study for Venezuela.  A rise in the foreign share of ownership in a 
sector reduced the output of individual domestically-owned establishments and reduced their 
total factor productivity over periods from one to three years.  The first year negative effect was 
particularly severe for small domestically-owned plants, suggesting that they were the least 
efficient and most vulnerable to the competition from the increasing efficiency associated with 
rises in foreign ownership.  Since Venezuela had been a relatively closed economy to both trade   15
and inward direct investment in manufacturing during this period, it might have accumulated a 
larger than average stock of small, competitively weak firms.  
Another panel study of a relatively closed economy was that of Kathuria (2000) using 
data for large firms in India, from 1975-76 to 1988-89, before the period of liberalization.  
Technical efficiency was measured from a function with value added as the production measure 
and labor and capital as inputs, and is taken to be the distance between a firm and the most 
efficient firm in its industry.  The indication of a spillover is a reduction in the dispersion of 
efficiency levels among domestically-owned firms in the industries studied, those industries in 
which foreign-owned firms were the efficiency leaders.  The foreign source of the spillovers was 
measured in two ways: the extent of foreign participation in the industry, represented by the 
foreign-owned firms’ share of sales, and the stock of cumulated purchases of foreign technology 
by local firms.  Foreign participation had a negative effect on the dispersion of efficiency among 
domestically-owned firms.  This effect was interpreted by the author as indicating negative 
spillovers.  He points out, however, that a negative spillover in these terms could result if both 
the foreign firms and the domestically-owned firms gained in efficiency, but the foreign-owned 
firms gained more, a result that would have been interpreted as a positive spillover in the Aitken 
and Harrison framework.  The stock of foreign technological capital of the local firms was 
positively related to their gains in efficiency.  When the sample was split between “scientific” 
and “non-scientific” industries, the spillover effects were confined to the “scientific” group” but 
were offset by a positive coefficient for the cross-product of foreign presence and the local firm’s 
R&D effort.  The interpretation was that R&D-intensive local firms might have gained, or lost 
less, from foreign presence than firms that did less R&D.  
   16
Productivity Spillovers in Indonesia 
One way of understanding the variety of results would be to apply the same techniques to 
the identical types of data in different countries.  Since we do not have access to data from many 
countries, we instead review studies of Indonesia and test alternative methods on that country’s 
data.  One advantage of using Indonesian data as a type of laboratory for experimentation is that 
it collects good micro data on manufacturing industry and has been increasingly used by a 
number of authors for plant level studies.A number of studies on Indonesia show foreign plants 
to have higher productivity than locally-owned plants (Takii and Ramstetter, 2003; Okamoto and 
Sjöholm, 2004) and that plants that change ownership from local to foreign ownership increase 
their level of productivity  (Anderson, 2000).  In addition, there are several plant level studies on 
spillovers from FDI in Indonesian manufacturing. These studies are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 here. 
 
The first three papers on spillovers from FDI in Indonesia used cross-section analysis. 
For instance, Sjöholm (1999a) examined plants in 1980 and 1991 and found both the level and 
growth of labor productivity to be higher for locally-owned plants in sectors with a high foreign 
share of output. There was no evidence of regional intra-industry spillovers from FDI, but some 
indications of regional inter-industry spillovers.  
  Sjöholm (1999b) used the same data as the study above to examine possible determinants 
of spillovers.  The results suggested that spillovers were positively affected by the technology 
gap between domestic and foreign plants and by the degree of competition within the sector.   17
  Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) examined spillovers from FDI in 1991. Their study 
differed in design from the previous two mainly in the use of capital stocks rather than 
investment ratios to control for capital intensity.  There were positive spillovers from FDI, and 
no differences in the spillovers from joint ventures with minority or majority foreign ownership. 
Takii (2001) was the first study on spillovers in Indonesia that used panel data, which 
allowed him to control for plant specific effects. He examined spillovers in the period 1990-95 
using a translog production function and found positive effects on value added in local firms 
from the share of foreign employment in the same 3-digit ISIC industry. Moreover, the results 
suggested that spillovers were relatively large in sectors with relatively new foreign plants and 
with low gaps in labor productivity between foreign- and domestic plants. R&D positively 
affects spillover in locally owned plants. 
The study by Todo and Miyamoto (2002) differ from most other papers on spillovers by 
the construction of the FDI variable as the absolute amount of FDI in a sector. They argued that 
this measure is more strongly related to the foreign knowledge stock and therefore preferred over 
the foreign share of a sector. The result showed a positive effect of FDI on local firms’ labor 
productivity after controlling for R&D and training of the work force.  
Blalock and Gertler (2002) also used a translog production function to examine spillovers 
between 1988 and 1996. Local firms in region-sectors with a high foreign share of output have 
high levels of productivity. Moreover, they found a positive effect on spillovers from the 
technology gap between domestic and foreign plants, and spillovers were also positively affected 
by local firms R&D, and by high education of workers in local firms. 
In a second paper by Blalock and Gertler (2003), using the same data and a very similar 
translog production function, there is no longer evidence of positive intra-industry spillovers   18
from FDI. The main difference between the two studies is a second measure on FDI in the latter; 
a measure on FDI in upstream markets that aims at capturing spillovers from FDI to local 
suppliers. Downstream FDI was highly significant in the econometric estimations. This variable 
is constructed with the use of an Input-Output table at a sector level, which also includes 
purchases from the own sector. One possibility is therefore that the variable on downstream FDI 
captured also the effect of horizontal spillovers.  
To sum up the results from studies on spillovers in Indonesian manufacturing, all cross-
section studies and three out of four panel data studies find statistically significant intra-industry 
spillovers. The one study that fails to find intra-industry spillovers finds instead inter-industry 
spillovers from FDI. Judging from studies on Indonesia, it does not seem to be the design of 
econometric studies that causes the different results found in the spillover literature. This 
indicates that it might instead be differences between countries or firms that explain the extent of 
spillovers . The studies on Indonesia might shed some further light on what such factors could 
be. Previous literature suggests that competition, the trade regime, technology gap and local 
firms’ absorptive capacity will affect the extent of spillovers. Starting with competition, the 
studies by Sjöholm (1999b) and by Blalock and Gertler (2003) show that spillovers are highest in 
sectors with high competition. The former study suggests that it is domestic competition, as 
captured by a Herfindahl index, rather than the degree of protection from imports that affects 
spillovers. The second study suggests that competition will benefit upstream local suppliers. 
The results on technology gap are unclear. Takii (2001) found a negative effect on 
spillovers from the technology gap between local- and foreign-owned plants, which has also 
been found in other countries (Kokko, 1994; 1996). Sjöholm (1999b) and Blalock and Gertler 
(2002) find a positive relation between the technology gap and the degree of spillovers. One   19
explanation for the different results could be that the measure on technology gap differs between 
studies. Takii measured the technology gap as the difference in labor productivity between 
domestically-owned and foreign-owned plants.
2 Sjöholm used the difference in labor 
productivity in foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants, after controlling for the scale of 
operation and the investment per worker ratio.
3 Blalock and Gertler used the plant’s fixed effect 
in comparison to the mean fixed effect in the same industry. Hence, the methodologies differ 
substantially, which is likely to cause the different results. Another reason why these, and other 
studies, differ with respect to the result on technology gap and spillovers could be that the 
relationship is non-linear. Some technology gap is presumably required for any useful 
technology spillovers to take place. However, it is also plausible that if the gap is too large, the 
technology in foreign plants will be of little practical use in locally-owned plants pursuing very 
different types of operations. 
Another cause of differences in spillovers between countries is differences in sectors’ and 
plants’ absorptive capacity. The studies on Indonesia confirm that such capacity might be 
important for benefits from spillovers. Takii (1991), Todo and Miyamoto (2002), and Blalock 
and Gertler (2002) found that a firm’s own R&D positively affected its ability to benefit from 
spillovers. The latter study also found that plants with more highly educated employees benefit 
more from the presence of foreign MNCs. A related issue is if the type of activities pursued by 
the foreign subsidiaries affects spillovers to domestically owned firms? This issue has been 
rather neglected in the spillover literature but Todo and Miyamoto (2002) find a positive effect 
on spillovers from R&D and human resource development in the foreign subsidiaries. 
                                                 
2 He also used the difference in capital-labour ratios and the difference in size as alternative measures on technology 
gaps. These measures gave inconclusive results. 
3 The difference in investment ratios was used as an alternative measure but provided no clear results.   20
As seen from the earlier discussion, considerable attention has been devoted to 
differences between econometric methodologies as one possible explanation to why the results 
on spillovers differ between countries. A related, but so far rather neglected, issue is how one 
should construct measures on FDI. Most studies use the foreign share of a sector’s economic 
activity as a measure of FDI.
4 One problem with this measure is that the foreign share of a sector 
might be endogenously determined if productivity spillovers expand activity in local firms. 
Moreover, this measure assumes that increases of foreign and aggregate activity in the same 
proportion should have no effect on local firms. Castellani and Zanfei (2002) argue that this 
assumption might produce a downward bias on the estimate of spillovers from FDI. Finally, it is 
not clear why we would assume the effect from FDI to be linear in the foreign share of an 
industry’s economic activity: spillovers are not obviously maximized at a 100 percent foreign 
ownership share (Lipsey, 2004). 
Although the foreign share is widely used as an FDI measure, productivity spillover 
studies still differ in how this share is constructed. Some measure it as the foreign share of 
employment, others as a share of value added or output. Moreover, the foreign share is calculated 
at different sector levels, ranging between 2-digit to 5-digit levels of ISIC. Finally, some studies 
use the foreign industry share at a national level, others at a regional level.  
The more narrow the definition of an industry, the more restrictive is our assumption on 
how widely applicable knowledge from FDI can be for local firms, and our assumption on which 
domestically-owned plants that face increased competition form FDI. If we construct the FDI 
measure on a 2-digit level of ISIC, it implies that productivity spillovers might be present 
between industries at a 3- and 5-digit level of ISIC but not from one 2-digit industry to another. 
                                                 
4 There are exceptions, see e.g. the previously discussed paper by Todo and Miyamoto (2002). See also Barrel and 
Pain (1997) who use aggregate FDI in a CES production function and find positive effects from FDI on technical 
progress in EU countries.   21
If we construct our measure on FDI at a 5-digit level of ISIC, it implies that productivity 
spillovers can only be captured if they take place within these industries but not if they cross 
from one 5-digit industry to another. It is unclear what a properly defined industry is for an 
analysis of productivity spillovers. It seems that most studies favor a disaggregated definition of 
FDI, possibly to increase the variance in the FDI variable. However, this might come at some 
costs if we miss out on spillovers across narrowly defined industries. Some technologies, such as 
computer use in tracking sales and inventories, may be very general and easily transmitted across 
industries, while others may be specific to particular production processes.  Clearly, the industry 
definition will also have implications for what we attribute to inter-industry versus intra-industry 
spillovers. 
The choice to construct the FDI measure at a national level or at a regional level might 
also be important. What the most appropriate level is depends on if spillover has a spatial 
dimension, i.e. that it primarily benefits plants within the same region. Jaffee et al (1993) is often 
referred to when a regional measure of FDI is used.
5 Their study shows that university R&D 
primarily benefits other inventors within the same geographic area. Hence, their study relates to 
innovation and it is possible, but not certain, that the same result exist also for spillovers. 
Whether or not spillovers are geographically concentrated depends on, for instance, if imitation, 
competition, or supply of linkage industries are enhanced by geographic proximity to the foreign 
firms. 
If we believe that technology spillovers are geographically concentrated, the next 
question will be what is an appropriate geographic aggregation level? Studies on Indonesia have 
used both districts (Sjöholm, 1999a) and provinces (Sjöholm, 1999a; Blalock, 2002, 2003). One 
methodological problem is that spillovers are not likely to follow administrative units even if 
                                                 
5 See Sjöholm (1999a), Blalock and Gertler (2002), and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004b).   22
they are localized. For instance, the largest share of Indonesian manufacturing is located in the 
province Western Java. This is largely due to an industry sector that has grown out of its original 
base in Jakarta. Jakarta and the West Java cities of Bogor, Tanggerang, and Berakasi, constitute 
one industrial cluster, the Jabotabek area (Henderson et al, 1996). If technology spillovers from 
FDI exist, and even if such spillovers are only effective with geographic proximity, a foreign 
firm in Jakarta is likely to have positive effects on local firms within the whole Jabotabek area. 
However, Jabotabek spreads out over two provinces and about ten districts, which indicates the 
problem of using administrative geographic units in constructing measures on regional FDI.  
  Spatial concentration of FDI may provide an obstacle to the analysis of regional FDI 
measures. Such concentration is common in most countries, including Indonesia. For instance, 
about 80 percent of all FDI in Indonesian manufacturing is located in three out of 27 provinces 
(East Java, West Java, and Jakarta), which is a higher concentration than for manufacturing in 
general (Sjöholm, 2002; Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2004). If, for instance, we construct our FDI 
measure at a province level and at a 5-digit level of ISIC – including about 300 industries – less 
than 25 percent of the  region-industry combinations will have  FDI.  It may be desirable to take 
account of that selection of locations in analyzing the effects of FDI. 
  An experiment with different industry and geographical definitions of the relevant scope 
for productivity spillovers is described in Table 3.  Spillovers are estimated at the national level 
and the province level, and for all sectors combined, as well as at 2-digit, 3-digit, and 5-digit 
industrial breakdowns. More specifically, we used Indonesian plant level data for 1996 to 
estimate the following expression: 
ij Public ij Size ij Capital ij Education FDI constant ij Laborprod + + + + + =    23
 where Laborprod is value added per employee, Capital is energy consumption per employee, 
Size is the total number of workers, Public is a dummy variable for public ownership, and 
Education is the share of employees with primary, junior, senior, and university education, for 
both blue- and white-collar workers. For sake of clarity, we show only the coefficients of the 
different FDI variables in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 here. 
 
The main impression from the results in Table 3 is that geographical influences are minor; the 
spillover coefficients at the national level are almost identical to those at the province level at 
each level of industry detail.  The industry level does make a difference. The coefficient is 
highest at the all- sector level, indicating a greater influence of foreign presence on domestic 
establishment productivity for manufacturing as a whole, than within 2-, 3-, or 5-digit industries.  
The coefficient is higher at the 3-digit level than at the 2-digit level, as one would expect if 
spillovers tended to be largest within a narrow industry.  However, the effect becomes smaller 
when we move to the 5-digit industries.  The behavior of productivity spillovers contrasts with 
that of wage spillovers, where going from the national to the province level raised the spillover 
coefficient at the 3-digit and 5-digit industry levels.  The difference between the wage and 
productivity spillovers is mostly, although not entirely, consistent with the idea that wage 
spillovers come through competition for labor in geographically narrow labor markets while 
productivity spillovers result from competition in country-wide product markets. 
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Conclusions 
  Why do studies of spillovers come to such diverse conclusions? With respect to wage 
spillovers, the use of cross-section or panel data does not seem to be the cause. As far as we can 
judge from Indonesia, the tendency of foreign-owned firms to gravitate to high-wage industries, 
while it exists, does not explain the apparent spillovers and neither does any tendency of foreign 
firms to take over high-wage local firms within industries.  Aside from Indonesia, most of the 
evidence for wage spillovers comes from developed countries, particularly the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  One hint that differences in labor market institutions might be important 
for the degree of wage spillovers is that two countries found to have negative spillovers were 
countries with very restrictive labor laws, while the United States and the United Kingdom were 
among the least restrictive. 
  With respect to productivity spillovers, an accumulation of panel data studies has erased 
the previous unanimity of panel data results in showing negative or no spillovers.  As with 
wages, firm-specific characteristics do not explain all the higher productivity found for domestic 
firms in industries where foreign-owned firms were important.  The econometric method does 
not seem to be the crucial determinant of the result.   
  An explanation that seems plausible at this point is that countries, and firms within 
countries, might differ in their ability to benefit from the presence of foreign- owned firms and 
their superior technology.  There might be countries or industries in which the domestically-
owned sector is too small or too backward to learn from foreign-owned firms.  In those cases, the 
domestic sector may be crushed by competition from the superior foreign-owned firms.  The 
state of the domestically-owned sector might depend not only on the stage of development of the   25
economy, but also on the type of trade regime.  A heavily protected domestically-owned sector 
might be inefficient and lacking in entrepreneurship. 
It makes sense that the arrival of foreign firms with technology greatly superior to that of 
domestically-owned firms should inflict damage on at least some domestic firms.  The least 
efficient, perhaps often the smallest, might become unprofitable or be forced out of the industry.  
One might view that outcome as favorable for the host country as a whole if the average 
productivity of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms together increased.  Few studies 
take account of both exits and the entrance of new firms, both important for judging the overall 
impact of inward FDI. 
  If country and industry differences are important to the impact of inward FDI on host 
countries, the main lesson might be that the search for universal relationships is futile.  In that 
case, the question shifts from how inward FDI affects every host country and industry to which 
types of industries and which types of host countries are affected, and what the impact is on 
each.  It is in searching for the characteristics of firms, industries, and countries that promote the 
transfer of technology that case studies can be most valuable.  Their flexibility with respect to 
assumptions regarding timing and types of technology transfer suggests what statistical studies 
should look for and how the variables should be defined, especially if they encompass a wide 
range of both successful and unsuccessful ventures. 
  Why has academic skepticism about the impact of FDI not influenced policy more 
strongly?  One reason is probably the diversity of findings.  Another is the narrow scope of 
technology in the statistical tests.  It relies on the assumption that the scale of operations and the 
import of components from abroad, and particularly from other related firms, do not constitute    26
part of affiliate technology, but are simple inputs, accessible to local as well as foreign firms.  




   27
References 
 
Aitken, Brian J., and Ann E. Harrison (1999), “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 605-
618. 
Aitken, Brian J., Ann E. Harrison, and Robert E. Lipsey (1996), Wages and Foreign Ownership: 
A Comparative Study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States,” Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 345-371. 
Anderson, Gary W. Jr. (2000), “Multinational Corporations and Tacit Knowledge: Determination 
of Entry-mode and Impact of Entry”, paper presented at the 7
th Convention of the East 
Asian Economic Association, 17-18 November 2000, Singapore. 
Baranson, Jack (1967) Manufacturing Problems in India: The Cummins Diesel Experience, 
Syracuse, Syracuse University Press. 
Barrel, R., and N. Pain (1997), “Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and 
Economic Growth within Europe”, Economic Journal, Vol. 107, pp. 1770-86. 
Blalock, Garrick and Paul Gertler (2002), “Firm Capabilities and Technology Adoption: 
Evidence from Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia”, Working Paper, Department of 
Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University. Downloaded from 
http://www.aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/gb78/ (accessed January 3, 2004).  
Blalock, Garrick and Paul J. Gertler (2003), “Technology from Foreign Direct Investment and 
Welfare Gains through the Supply Chain”, Working Paper, Department of Applied 
Economics and Management, Cornell University. Downloaded from 
http://www.aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/gb78/ (accessed January 3, 2004). 
   28
Blomström, Magnus and Fredrik Sjöholm (1999), “Technology Transfer and Spillovers: Does 
Local Participation with Multinationals Matter?”, European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 
pp. 915-923. 
Botero, Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer (2003), “The Regulation of Labor,” NBER Working Paper 9756, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Carkovic, Maria, and Ross Levine (2002), “Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate 
Economic Growth?” University of Minnesota, Department of Finance, Working Paper, 
June. 
Castellani, Davide and Antonello Zanfei (2002), “Multinational Companies and Productivity 
Spillovers: Is there a Specification Error?” mimeo, ISI Università di Urbino. 
Dobson, Wendy, and Chia Siow Yue, Editors (1997), Multinationals and East Asian Integration, 
Ottawa, Canada, International Development Research Centre. 
Driffield, N., and Sourafel Girma (2002), “Regional Foreign Direct Investment and Wage 
Spillovers: Plant Level Evidence from the Electronics Industry,” Research Paper 
2002/04, Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy. 
Figlio, David N., and Bruce A. Bloningen (2000), “The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on 
Local Communities”, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 48, Issue 2, September, pp. 338-
363. 
Girma, Sourafel, David Greenaway, and Katherine Wakelin (2001), “Who Benefits from Foreign 
Direct Investment in the UK?,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 48, No. 2, 
May, pp. 119-133.   29
Görg, Holger, and David Greenaway (2001), “Foreign Direct Investment and Intra-industry 
Spillovers: A Review of the Literature,” Globalisation and Labor Markets Programme, 
Research Paper No. 2001/37.  Nottingham, U.K.: Leverhulme Centre for Research on 
Globalisation and Economic Policy. 
Görg, Holger, and Eric Strobl (2001), “Multinational Companies and Productivity Spillovers: A 
Meta-analysis,” Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 475, pp. F723-F739 
Haskel, Jonathan E., Sonia C. Pereira, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2002), “Does Inward Foreign 
Direct Investment Boost the Productivity of Domestic Firms?”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 8724. 
Henderson, Vernon J., Ari Kuncoro, and Damhuri Nasution (1996), “The Dynamics of Jabotabek 
Development”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 32, pp. 71-95.  
Jaffe, Adam B., Manuel Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson (1993), “Geographic Localization 
of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 577-98. 
Kathuria, Vinish (2000), “Productivity Spillovers from Technology Transfer to Indian 
Manufacturing Firms,” Journal of International Development, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 343-
369. 
Keller, Wolfgang, and Stephen R. Yeaple (2003), “Multinational Enterprises, International 
Trade, and Productivity Growth: Firm Level Evidence From the United States,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 9504. 
Kokko, Ari (1994), “Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers”, Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 279-93.   30
Kokko, Ari (1996), “Productivity Spillovers from Competition Between Local Firms and 
Foreign Affiliates”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 8, pp. 517-30. 
Lipsey, Robert E. (2003), “Foreign Direct Investment, Growth, and Competitiveness in 
Developing Countries,” in Peter K. Cornelius, Editor, The Global Competitiveness 
Report, 2002-2003, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 295-305. 
_____________ (2004), “Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment,” in 
Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan Winters, Editors, Challenges to Globalization, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming. 
_____________ , and Fredrik Sjöholm (2002), “Foreign Firms and Indonesian Manufacturing 
Wages: An Analysis with Panel Data,” NBER Working Paper 9417, December. 
______________________________ (2004a), “Foreign Direct Investment, Education, and 
Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing“, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 73, No. 
1, February, pp. 415-422.. 
_______________________________  (2004b), “FDI and Wage Spillovers in Indonesian 
Manufacturing,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, forthcoming. 
Moran, Theodore H. (2001), Parental Supervision: The New Paradigm for Foreign Direct 
Investment, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, August. 
________________ (2002), Beyond Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in 
Developing Countries, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press. 
Okamoto, Yumiko and Fredrik Sjöholm (2004), “FDI and the Dynamics of Productivity in 
Indonesian Manufacturing”, Journal of Development Studies, forthcoming.  
Rhee, Yung Whee, and Therese Belot (1990), “Export Catalysts in Low-Income Countries, 
 Word Bank Discussion Paper No. 72,  Washington, DC, World Bank.   31
Sjöberg, Örjan and Fredrik Sjöholm (2004), “Trade Liberalization and the Geography of 
Production: Agglomeration, Concentration and Dispersal in Indonesia’s Manufacturing 
Industry”, Economic Geography, forthcoming. 
Sjöholm, Fredrik (1999a), “Productivity Growth in Indonesia: The Role of Regional 
Characteristics and Direct Foreign Investment”, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 47(3), pp. 559-584. 
Sjöholm, Fredrik (1999b), “Technology Gap, Competition and Spillovers from Direct Foreign 
Investment: Evidence From Establishment Data”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 
36(1), pp. 53-73. 
Sjöholm, Fredrik (2002), “The Challenge of FDI and Regional Development in Indonesia”, 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 32 (3), pp. 381-393. 
Takii, Sadayukii (2001), “Productivity Spillovers and Characteristics of Foreign Multinational 
Plants in Indonesian Manufacturing 1990-95”, ICSEAD Working Paper No. 2001-14, 
Kitakyushu, Japan. 
Takii, Sadayukii and Eric D. Ramstetter (2003), “Employment, Production, Labor Productivity, 
and Foreign Multinationals in Indonesian Manufacturing, 1975-2000”, ICSEAD Working 
Paper No. 2003-25, Kitakyushu, Japan. 
Todo, Yasuyuki and Koji Miyamoto (2002), “Knowledge Diffusion from Multinational 
Enterprises: The Role of Domestic and Foreign Knowledge-Enhancing Activities”, 
OECD Technical Paper No. 196, OECD Development Centre. 
World Bank (2003), “Doing Business,” Washington, DC, The World Bank.   32
 
Table 1. Coefficients for Impact of FDI on Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing. 










































Source: Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004b). Note: t-statistics within brackets. ***) Significant at the 1 
percent level. 
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Table 2. Studies on Productivity Spillovers from FDI in Indonesian Manufacturing. 











































































































Note: *** - Significant at the 1 % level. ? - Not statistically significant.    34
Table 3. Productivity spillovers in Indonesian manufacturing (dependent variable – value added 
per employee) 




























Source: Note: t-statistics within brackets. ***) Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 